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INTRODUCTION 
For over eighteen years, Darryl Hunt sat in his prison cell 
searching for ways to tell the world he was an innocent man.1 He was 
convicted for the 1984 rape and murder of a woman in Winston-
Salem, North Carolina.2 Over the next two decades, he filed eleven 
motions in four different courts, but to no avail.3 The criminal justice 
system condemned the wrong man, and then made it nearly 
impossible for that man to be heard. Eventually, thanks in large part 
to the press that kept digging up exculpatory information and drawing 
attention to his case, DNA testing identified the right man.4 That man 
confessed, and Darryl was cleared. In 2004, a judge vacated the 
murder conviction, and Darryl was pardoned by Governor Mike 
Easley.5 Stories like this shake the very foundation of the criminal 
justice system and can cause the public to lose faith in the system of 
laws. North Carolina has had many of these stories.6 
Although wrongful convictions are not unique to North Carolina, 
the state’s response to this growing problem has been very unique. In 
fact, North Carolina has taken the lead and established a model for 
addressing wrongful convictions. On August 3, 2006, Governor 
 
Copyright © 2007 by Jerome M. Maiatico. 
 1. Phoebe Zerwick & David Rice, Governor Pardons Hunt: 20-year Ordeal Ends for Man 
Wrongly Convicted, WINSTON-SALEM J., Apr. 16, 2004, at A1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Christine Mumma, Editorial, An Escape Route from Prison for the Innocent, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 30, 2005, at 9A. 
 4. Zerwick & Rice, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See infra notes 18–31 and accompanying text. 
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Easley signed House Bill 13237 into law, making North Carolina the 
first and only state in the United States to establish an innocence 
inquiry commission—an independent review commission set up to 
investigate prisoner’s claims of innocence.8 Former Chief Justice I. 
Beverly Lake Jr. of the Supreme Court of North Carolina greeted this 
commission by saying, “I think it will be a significant step forward for 
the criminal justice system in North Carolina and across the 
nation . . . . I think other states may follow.”9 North Carolina’s 
innocence inquiry commission could indeed become a model for how 
states, and even the federal government, should handle wrongful 
convictions, but only if it is successful. All eyes will be on North 
Carolina.10 
To evaluate the likelihood that the North Carolina innocence 
inquiry commission will be successful, this Note examines the United 
Kingdom review commission after which it was patterned.11 The 
United Kingdom review commission has achieved moderate success 
in correcting mistakes made by its own criminal justice system.12 From 
a comparative perspective, the North Carolina innocence inquiry 
commission should be able to match that success if it can avoid 
budget and resource pitfalls, and operate in a manner that improves 
judicial economy. Just as the appellate process in the United 
Kingdom was not designed to handle miscarriages of justice,13 the 
prior avenues for postconviction relief in the North Carolina judicial 
system were not equipped to address claims of innocence. The North 
Carolina innocence inquiry commission ameliorates that problem by 
 
 7. H.R. 1323, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006). 
 8. Kytja Weir, N.C. to Look at Innocence Claims: State is 1st in Nation to Create an 
Independent Review of Possible Wrongful Convictions, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 4, 2006, 
at B1. 
 9. Henry Weinstein, N.C. to Weigh Claims of Innocence, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2006, at 
A18. 
 10. Stephen Saloom, the policy director for the Innocence Project at the Cardozo School of 
Law, said the “whole nation will be watching” what happens in North Carolina. Weir, supra 
note 8. 
 11. The United Kingdom’s Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) was enacted by 
Parliament under the Criminal Appeal Act of 1995. Christine Mumma, The North Carolina 
Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon Perspectives Joined By a Common Cause, 52 
DRAKE L. REV. 647, 654 (2004). The CCRC is an independent body responsible for 
investigating miscarriages of justice in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Id. 
 12. See infra notes 177–180 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 127–129 and accompanying text. 
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providing an effective forum for prisoners like Darryl Hunt where 
new evidence strongly supports their innocence claims. 
This Note is divided into four sections and provides background 
and analysis of “innocence commission” issues in North Carolina. 
Part I discusses the need for change in the North Carolina criminal 
justice system and advocates the idea of an innocence commission. 
Part II provides background on the new North Carolina Innocence 
Inquiry Commission (NCIIC) and details the process through which 
the NCIIC will review factual innocence claims. Part III provides 
background on the United Kingdom’s Criminal Cases Review 
Commission (CCRC) and details its process for reviewing miscarriage 
of justice claims. Part IV analyzes the differences between the North 
Carolina and United Kingdom commissions and predicts the success 
of the NCIIC. The Note concludes by describing how the innocence 
inquiry commission in North Carolina may provide the foundation for 
reform of the postconviction relief available in the federal and state 
criminal justice systems. 
I.  THE NEED FOR AN INNOCENCE  
COMMISSION IN NORTH CAROLINA 
The criminal justice system fails society when an innocent person 
is convicted and the actual criminal remains free. As with any system 
operated by humans, though, the criminal justice system is imperfect 
and makes mistakes. Unfortunately, for many years there was no real 
way to gauge the accuracy of the system or pinpoint specific cases 
where the system made mistakes.14 This changed with the advent of 
DNA technology and its application in forensic investigations in the 
1980s.15 In 1989, an Illinois inmate became the first innocent man to 
be exonerated by DNA technology, marking “the beginning of a 
revolution in the American criminal justice system.”16 Since 1989, a 
body of specific cases—both related and unrelated to DNA 
evidence—has developed in which it is evident that the criminal 
justice system convicted the wrong person. Between 1989 and 2003, 
 
 14. See Keith Findley, Learning From Our Mistakes: Criminal Justice Commission to Study 
Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 334 (2002) (stating that without a valid measure 
“it is so very hard to know which outcomes are accurate and which are not”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 through 2003, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523 (2005) (“Since 1989, these once-rare events [exonerations of 
falsely convicted defendants] have become disturbingly commonplace.”). 
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340 individuals in the United States were exonerated from crimes for 
which they had been previously convicted, including 144 individuals 
cleared by DNA technology.17 North Carolina has been significantly 
affected by this “revolution.” In addition to Darryl Hunt, many high-
profile cases of exonerations have emerged in the state over the past 
decade: 
• Ronald Cotton from Burlington, North Carolina served 
eleven years in prison after being convicted of two 1984 
rapes.18 In 1995, DNA tests proved that Cotton was innocent 
of the crimes.19 
• Lesly Jean was arrested in Jacksonville, North Carolina in 
1982 and convicted of rape and sexual assault.20 Jean served 
nine years in prison before his conviction was overturned 
because police had failed to disclose important evidence.21 
In 2001, DNA tests proved that the criminal justice system 
had convicted the wrong man.22 
• Terence Garner served nearly four years in prison for the 
1997 armed robbery of a finance company and shooting of a 
secretary in Johnston County, North Carolina.23 After 
Garner’s trial, three alibi witnesses emerged and another 
 
 17. Id. at 524. Gross describes his study as follows: 
The exonerations we have studied occurred in four ways: (1) In forty-two cases 
governors (or other appropriate executive officers) issued pardons based on evidence 
of the defendants’ innocence. (2) In 263 cases criminal charges were dismissed by 
courts after new evidence of innocence emerged, such as DNA. (3) In thirty-one cases 
the defendants were acquitted at a retrial on the basis of evidence that they had no 
role in the crimes for which they were originally convicted. (4) In four cases, states 
posthumously acknowledged the innocence of defendants who has already died in 
prison . . . . 
This is the most comprehensive compilations of exonerations available, but it is not 
exhaustive. 
Id. at 524–25 (citations omitted). 
 18. Phoebe Zerwick, Closed Doors: Case Review Finds that a Series of Troubling Decisions 
Cast a Dark Shadow of Doubt over a Divisive Case, WINSTON-SALEM J., Nov. 23, 2003, at A1. 
 19. Id. Cotton’s case involved the misidentification of Cotton by one of the victims. Id. 
 20. Rebecca J. Britton, The Lesly Jean Story: A Quest for Truth, A Quest for Justice, TRIAL 
BRIEFS, Jan. 2002, at 38, 38, available at http://www.ncmoratorium.org/site/documents/Britton 
Jan02.pdf; The Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Lesly Jean, http://www.innocenceproject.org 
/Content/183.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2007). 
 21. The Innocence Project, supra note 20. “[Jean’s] conviction was based, in part, on 
prosecutorial error and erroneous eyewitness testimony.” Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Jane Ruffin & Adrienne Lu, Retrial Ruled Out for Garner: For Prosecutor, SBI Report 
Raises Doubts, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 12, 2002, at 1A. 
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man confessed to the crime.24 The PBS documentary series 
“Frontline” aired Garner’s story in January 2002, and one 
month later Garner was released from prison.25 The district 
attorney dismissed all charges against Garner in June 2002.26 
• Leo Waters served twenty-one years in prison after being 
convicted in the 1981 rape and sexual assault of a woman in 
Jacksonville, North Carolina.27 Waters was cleared of the 
crime by a DNA test in 2003, and all charges against him 
were dismissed.28 
• Alan Gell served nearly nine years in prison, including four 
years on death row, for the 1995 murder of a North Carolina 
man.29 Gell was granted a new trial shortly after the local 
newspaper ran a series outlining problems with the first 
trial, including prosecutorial misconduct.30 In 2004, Gell was 
acquitted of the murder.31 
Given these cases, it is evident that innocent persons are 
sometimes convicted in North Carolina while the real criminals 
remain at large. These cases are representative of widespread 
problems that plague the criminal justice system, such as 
misidentifications, “false confessions, lab errors, prosecutorial 
misconduct, false witness testimony, poor legal representation, and 
‘investigative tunnel vision.’”32 Studies have consistently 
demonstrated that Americans have less confidence in the criminal 
justice system than in other institutions,33 which likely results in part 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. Garner’s attorney, Mark Montgomery, credits the PBS documentary series with 
providing the impetus for his client’s release: “It’s humbling to realize I spent four years trying 
to get this kid, who I believe to be innocent, out of prison using all my lawyer skills, and a 90-
minute television documentary springs him like magic.” Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Associated Press, Massachusetts Inmate is Charged in ‘81 Rape, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, Aug. 18, 2005, at 4B; The Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Leo Waters, http:// 
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/284.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2007). 
 28. The Innocence Project, supra note 27. 
 29. Joseph Neff, Gell Found Not Guilty, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 19, 
2004, at 1A. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Mumma, supra note 3. 
 33. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS 112 (2003) (providing statistics in Table 2.10, “Reported Confidence in 
Selected Institutions,” that show Americans have less confidence in the criminal justice system 
than in institutions such as banking, the medical system, public school, and television news). 
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from such documented, high-profile mistakes. The issue is not 
whether the North Carolina criminal justice system makes mistakes, 
because it clearly does. Instead, the issue has become how the system 
can be improved to limit and correct these mistakes, so that the 
government may rebuild public confidence in the system. 
Currently, the North Carolina criminal justice system provides 
little or no redress for innocent prisoners with factual innocence 
claims.34 The criminal justice system generally provides a right to 
direct and collateral review; however, the scope of this review is 
limited to fixing legal and procedural errors, not reassessing guilt or 
innocence.35 A convicted prisoner with a factual innocence claim can 
pursue three avenues for relief: 1) a post-trial Motion for Appropriate 
Relief based upon newly discovered evidence, 2) federal relief based 
upon the writ of habeas corpus, or 3) executive clemency from the 
Governor. Each of these avenues has significant flaws that make it 
ineffective. First, the remedial scope of the Motion for Appropriate 
Relief is substantially restricted by State v. Britt.36 Second, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Herrera v. Collins37 and the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)38 
severely limit the scope of habeas relief in federal courts.39 Finally, 
executive clemency, a prisoner’s last resort, is often considered an 
arbitrary process affected by wholly political factors.40 
In North Carolina, all post-trial motions relating to the trial, 
including factual innocence claims based on newly discovered 
evidence, must be brought under a Motion for Appropriate Relief 
 
 34. Gary D. Robertson, N.C. Senate Panel Eyes “Innocence Commission,” STAR-NEWS 
(Wilmington, N.C.), Apr. 14, 2005, http://search.starnewsonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article? 
AID=/20050415/NEWS/50414021&SearchID=73272979646223 (last visited Feb. 21, 2007) 
(paraphrasing Dick Taylor, member of the N.C. Actual Innocence Commission and Executive 
Director of the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers); Interview with James Coleman, 
Professor, Duke Univ. School of Law, in Durham, N.C. (Dec. 8, 2005). 
 35. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 404–05 (1993) (holding that factual 
innocence is not a freestanding basis upon which a federal court generally may grant habeas 
relief). 
 36. See State v. Britt, 360 S.E.2d 660, 664 (N.C. 1987) (applying a seven-factor test 
narrowly, making it difficult for defendants to get a new trial). 
 37. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 38. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Relief Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2266 (2000). 
 39. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404–05. 
 40. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power 
from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 608–10 (1991) (arguing that political pressures cause 
executive clemency to be an ineffective remedy for wronged prisoners). 
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(MAR).41 An MAR, which is generally reviewed by the trial judge, 
allows a defendant to contest the trial court’s decision even after all 
direct appeals have been exhausted.42 A defendant is allowed to file 
an MAR within a “reasonable time” after new evidence is 
discovered.43 However, under the North Carolina statute and Britt, 
there is a strict standard for evaluating an MAR on the grounds of 
newly discovered evidence, and relief is rarely granted.44 The Britt 
court explained that to meet this standard, the defendant must prove 
each of the following elements: 
1. That the witness or witnesses will give newly discovered 
evidence. 
2. That such newly discovered evidence is probably true. 
3. That it is competent, material and relevant. 
4. That due diligence was used and proper means were 
employed to procure the testimony at trial. 
5. That the newly discovered evidence is not merely cumulative. 
6. That it does not tend only to contradict a former witness or to 
impeach or discredit him. 
7. That it is of such a nature as to show that on another trial a 
different result will probably be reached and that the right will 
prevail.45 
Factual innocence claims under an MAR also suffer from 
procedural and judge-related limitations.46 For example, MARs based 
 
 41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1411(c) (2005 & Supp. 2006). 
 42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1415(a) (2005). Unless the defendant files an MAR within ten 
days after entry of judgment, however, this form of relief is available only when the defendant 
appeals on one of several enumerated grounds. See id. § 15A-1415(b) (enumerating “the only 
grounds which the defendant may assert by a motion for appropriate relief made more than 10 
days after entry of judgment”). 
 43. Id. § 15A-1415(c). 
 44. See State v. Britt, 360 S.E.2d 660, 664 (N.C. 1987) (restricting the remedial scope of 
section 15A-1415(c)). According to statute, the defendant has the heavy burden of establishing 
that the newly discovered evidence was “unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the time 
of trial . . . could not with due diligence have been discovered or made available at that time . . . 
and . . . has a direct and material bearing upon . . . the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” § 15A-
1415(c). 
 45. Britt, 360 S.E.2d at 664 (quoting State v. Cronin, 262 S.E.2d 277, 286 (1980)). 
 46. Eli Paul Mazur, “I’m Innocent”: Addressing Freestanding Claims of Innocence in State 
and Federal Courts, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 197, 204–16 (2003). Mazur contends that the MAR in 
North Carolina is subject to three pervasive limitations: (1) “[t]he [d]ue [d]iligence [p]roblem,” 
in which “North Carolina courts consistently deny MAR . . . because the evidence was available 
at trial, [thus] punish[ing] factually innocent and wrongfully incarcerated inmates because of the 
lack of resources or the ineptitude of trial counsel,” id. at 205–06; (2) “the [s]tatutory 
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upon newly discovered evidence are often denied for failure to meet 
the due diligence standard.47 This standard prevents the submission of 
evidence if it was available at the time of trial but simply not 
discovered by defense lawyers, possibly due to lack of time or 
funding.48 Relief also will not be granted on an MAR if the newly 
discovered evidence is “merely cumulative,” meaning that judges will 
not consider new, stronger exculpatory evidence that is related to 
evidence already admitted at trial.49 
Moreover, the judge who presided over the trial generally 
entertains the MAR50 and must determine “that on another trial a 
different result will probably be reached.”51 One study of MAR 
proceedings uncovered “a tension between the trial judge’s 
investment in the original trial result and the petitioner’s protected 
interest in presenting newly discovered evidence of actual 
innocence.”52 In Darryl Hunt’s case, it took eleven motions over an 
eighteen-year period to overcome the procedural and judge-related 
limitations imposed by North Carolina law.53 
Federal courts also provide prisoners with little redress for 
factual innocence claims. Under federal habeas corpus law, prisoners 
must overcome a high burden for relief to be granted based on newly 
discovered evidence.54 In addition, federal law makes it difficult for 
 
[p]reference for the [t]rial [j]udge to entertain the MAR,” in which the trial judge is more likely 
to cast doubt on new evidence that would change the trial result and is “subject to direct 
electoral pressure [and thus] less likely to find error . . . in state post-conviction proceedings,” id. 
at 207; and (3) “[r]ecanted [t]estimony of [c]odefendants,” in which “North Carolina courts 
consistently dispose of MAR based upon the recantation or repudiation of codefendant 
testimony by holding that the recantation is ‘exceedingly unreliable,’” id. at 214. 
 47. Id. at 205. 
 48. Id. at 204–05. 
 49. Britt, 360 S.E.2d at 664. 
 50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1413(a)–(c) (2005). This statute has a strong built-in preference 
for the trial judge: 
The judge who presided at the trial is empowered to act upon a motion for 
appropriate relief. . . . When a motion for appropriate relief may be made before a 
judge who did not hear the case, he may, if it is practicable to do so, refer all or a part 
of the matter for decision to the judge who heard the case. 
Id. § 15A-1413(b)–(c). 
 51. Britt, 360 S.E.2d at 664. 
 52. Mazur, supra note 46, at 214. 
 53. Mumma, supra note 3; see also supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence must 
be made within three years of final judgment and will be granted only “if required in the interest 
of justice.” Id. 
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claims of factual innocence to be heard by federal courts,55 and 
prisoners face a strict one-year statute of limitations on most federal 
habeas petitions.56 The AEDPA further restricts innocent prisoners 
by requiring greater deference to state courts,57 some of which offer 
very limited avenues for postconviction relief, like in North 
Carolina.58 For example, one provision of the AEDPA limits the 
power of federal courts to grant relief unless the state court’s 
handling of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law . . . [or] was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 
in light of the evidence presented in the State court.”59 
The Supreme Court has seldom ruled on the availability of 
federal habeas relief for factual innocence claims.60 In Kuhlmann v. 
Wilson,61 the Court held the door open to freestanding factual 
innocence claims, stating “[e]ven where . . . the many judges who have 
reviewed the prisoner’s claims . . . have determined that his trial was 
free from constitutional error, a prisoner retains a powerful and 
legitimate interest in obtaining his release from custody if he is 
 
 55. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2000) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it 
appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”); 
id. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) (forbidding federal courts from holding evidentiary hearings on claims 
for which an applicant failed to develop the factual basis in state court proceedings, unless that 
factual basis “could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due 
diligence”). 
 56. Id. § 2244(d)(1). 
 57. Id. § 2254(d)(1). 
 58. See supra notes 41–53 and accompanying text. 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). 
 60. See, e.g., House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2086–87 (2006) (“[The] question [is] whether 
federal courts may entertain convincing [freestanding] claims of actual innocence . . . . We 
decline to resolve this issue.”); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 328 (1995) (distinguishing the 
freestanding factual innocence claim in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), from Schlup’s 
gateway innocence claim); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398–99 (see infra text accompanying notes 64–
68); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (“[A] federal court may hear the merits of the 
successive claims [through the ‘actual innocence’ exception] if the failure to hear the claims 
would constitute a ‘miscarriage of justice.’”); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452–53 (1986) 
(see infra text accompanying notes 61–63); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963) (“[T]he 
existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a 
ground or relief on federal habeas corpus.”). This Note provides only a brief overview of federal 
habeas relief jurisprudence. Because this Note focuses on innocence commissions, the 
remainder of the discussion of federal relief in this Part concentrates on the finality principle in 
Kuhlmann and the ultimate issue of whether habeas relief can be granted on a freestanding 
factual innocence claim in Herrera. 
 61. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986). 
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innocent of the charge for which he was incarcerated.”62 It noted, 
however, that a prisoner’s strong interest in access to a forum to test 
the fundamental correctness of his conviction must be carefully 
balanced against the state’s interest in the finality of its criminal 
justice proceedings.63 
Subsequently, in Herrera, the Court said that factual innocence is 
not a freestanding basis upon which a federal court may generally 
grant habeas relief.64 It concluded that factual innocence claims based 
solely upon newly discovered evidence do not raise a constitutional 
issue,65 with the possible narrow exception of those involving a “truly 
persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’” in capital cases.66 The 
Court further reasoned that determinations of guilt or innocence are 
reserved for the state courts, and that trial evidence should not be 
reconsidered in federal courts.67 It viewed executive clemency as the 
“fail safe” that allows the criminal justice system to correct wrongful 
convictions.68 Since Herrera, no federal habeas relief has been granted 
to any prisoner based on a freestanding factual innocence claim.69 
 
 62. Id. at 452. 
 63. Id. at 452–53. The Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he deterrent force of penal laws is diminished to the extent that persons 
contemplating criminal activity believe there is a possibility that they will escape 
punishment through repetitive collateral attacks. Similarly, finality serves the State’s 
goal of rehabilitating those who commit crimes because “[r]ehabilitation demands 
that the convicted defendant realize that ‘he is justly subject to sanction, that he 
stands in need of rehabilitation.’” Finality also serves the State’s legitimate punitive 
interests. When a prisoner is freed on a successive petition, often many years after his 
crime, the State may be unable successfully to retry him. This result is unacceptable if 
the State must forgo conviction of a guilty defendant through the “erosion of 
memory” and “dispersion of witnesses” that occur with the passage of time that 
invariably attends collateral attack. 
Id. (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127–28 & n.32 (1982)) (citations omitted). 
 64. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400. 
 65. Id. at 404 (“Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence [do not] 
state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring 
in the underlying state criminal proceeding.”). 
 66. Id. at 417. 
 67. See id. at 401 (“Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials.” 
(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983))). 
 68. See id. at 415 (“Executive clemency has provided the ‘fail safe’ in our criminal justice 
system. . . . [H]istory is replete with examples of wrongfully convicted persons [and] [c]lemency 
provided the relief mechanism . . . .”). 
 69. Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1241, 1305 (2001); see, e.g., House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2087 (2006) 
(stating that “the threshold for any hypothetical freestanding innocence claim [is] 
‘extraordinarily high’” and “that House’s showing falls short of the threshold”). 
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The executive clemency provision of the North Carolina 
Constitution vests the governor with the power to “grant reprieves, 
commutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses . . . upon 
such conditions as he may think proper.”70 However, executive 
clemency is often considered an arbitrary process, and the governor’s 
decision may be affected by wholly political factors.71 As one 
commentator suggests, “The most important factor in successful 
clemency applications appears to be the widespread support of 
influential individuals in the community.”72 Clemency requests are 
rarely granted, and when they are, it is generally only after the 
prisoner has been released from the criminal justice system.73 The 
governor also has complete and unfettered authority to reject 
requests. For example, Governor Easley once refused to recuse 
himself from a clemency decision regarding a case he prosecuted as 
district attorney—a seemingly obvious example of a conflict of 
interest.74 For these reasons, clemency is often not viewed as a 
practical alternative for prisoners with factual innocence claims.75 
Why have North Carolina courts and federal courts chosen to 
make it so difficult for prisoners to obtain postconviction review? The 
answer may lie in what the Supreme Court calls the principle of 
finality. In Kuhlmann, the Court stated that the “[u]nlimited 
availability of federal collateral attack burdens our criminal justice 
system as successive petitions divert the time of judges, prosecutors, 
 
 70. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5, cl. 6. 
 71. See Kobil, supra note 40, at 608–10 (arguing that political pressures cause executive 
clemency to be an ineffective remedy for wronged prisoners). 
 72. Id. at 610. 
 73. Governor Easley is currently considering about 250 clemency requests. He has taken 
action on four requests since he took office in 2001, granting clemency to Lesly Jean and Darryl 
Hunt (with DNA evidence to exonerate them) and commuting two death penalty sentences to 
life in prison. Power To Pardon in N.C. Ends with Governor, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, 
N.C.), Mar. 20, 2005, at 14A. Prior to Governor Easley’s administration, only three North 
Carolina death row inmates in nearly a quarter of a century had had their sentences commuted 
to life in prison by the governor. Death Penalty Information Center, Clemency News and 
Developments: 2002-2001, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=2056 (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2007). 
 74. Associated Press, Convicted N.C. Man Won’t Be Pardoned, USATODAY.COM, Aug. 18, 
2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-08-18-nopardonnc_x.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 
2007). 
 75. See, e.g., Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims 
After Herrera v. Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 514–15 (1998) (contending that executive 
clemency is not a meaningful alternative for those with actual innocence claims because of the 
lack of procedural safeguards and considerable discretion given to one individual). 
04__MAIATICO.DOC 6/7/2007  4:14 PM 
1356 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1345 
and lawyers from the important task of trying criminal cases.”76 The 
finality principle stands for the practical reality that courts do not 
want to be flooded with petitions from prisoners claiming they are 
innocent, especially given that those prisoners’ guilt has already been 
adjudicated. This same principle also applies at the state level, as 
commentators suggest that the current MAR law was written to 
“control the volume of claims” in the North Carolina criminal justice 
system.77 The court system was not designed to provide 
comprehensive review of factual innocence claims and is not 
equipped to handle an influx of such claims. An independent review 
commission relieves the burden placed on the criminal justice system 
by providing an important screening mechanism for the courts. 
II.  THE NORTH CAROLINA INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION 
In response to highly publicized wrongful convictions in North 
Carolina, such as those of Terence Garner and Ronald Cotton, Chief 
Justice I. Beverly Lake Jr. created a task force called the North 
Carolina Actual Innocence Commission (NCAIC) in November 
2002.78 The NCAIC was established to address wrongful conviction 
issues and to improve “North Carolina’s justice system and [its] 
citizen’s [sic] faith in it.”79 More specifically, the primary objective of 
the NCAIC 
is to make recommendations [to North Carolina] which reduce or 
eliminate the possibility of the wrongful conviction of an innocent 
person. Through its work, the [NCAIC] hopes to raise awareness of 
the issues surrounding wrongful convictions[,] . . . increase the 
conviction of the guilty, positively impact public trust and 
confidence in [North Carolina’s] justice system, and decrease the 
overall cost of the prosecution, trial and appeal processes.80 
 
 76. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 n.16 (1986) (citations omitted). 
 77. E.g., Interview with Christine Mumma, Exec. Dir., N.C. Actual Innocence Comm’n, 
Duke Univ. School of Law, in Durham, N.C. (Feb. 15, 2006). 
 78. Staff of Carolina Journal Online, Friday Interview: Wrongful Convictions, CAROLINA J. 
ONLINE, Oct. 28, 2005, http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display_exclusive.html?id= 
2883 (last visited Feb. 24, 2007). 
 79. Mumma, supra note 11, at 649. 
 80. Id. at 651. 
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Representatives of each arm of the criminal justice system in North 
Carolina sit on the NCAIC.81 
The NCAIC’s first study was on erroneous eyewitness 
identification, which is recognized “as the leading factor in the 
wrongful conviction of those exonerated nationally by DNA 
evidence.”82 In October 2003, after months of research, the NCAIC 
issued recommended procedures for law enforcement officials 
conducting eyewitness identification in North Carolina.83 
The NCAIC next studied the postconviction availability of 
factual innocence claim review, with members agreeing “that neither 
the appellate nor adversarial process is conducive to postconviction 
review of claims of innocence.”84 Members of the NCAIC discussed 
the structural and procedural considerations for factual innocence 
claim review under North Carolina’s criminal justice system.85 They 
drafted a proposal for the creation of an independent “innocence 
commission” that would review factual innocence claims,86 looking to 
the United Kingdom’s Criminal Cases Review Commission as a 
prototype.87 In March 2005, the NCAIC voted nineteen to nine to 
send the proposal to the North Carolina General Assembly.88 
 
 81. Id. The NCAIC is a group of approximately thirty members, including “the Chief 
Justice . . . the State Attorney General . . . law enforcement, defense attorneys, [and] victim 
advocates.” Id. 
 82. Id. at 652. 
 83. Id. at 653. 
 84. Id. at 654. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Associated Press, Innocence Commission Proposes Review Board, INJUSTICEBUSTERS, 
Mar. 9, 2005, http://injusticebusters.com/05/North_Carolina.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
 87. Mumma, supra note 11, at 654. 
 88. Associated Press, supra note 86. 
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The bill stagnated in committee, but with a few modifications89 
eventually found strong bipartisan support and was approved by the 
House and Senate in late July 2006.90 The most significant 
compromise was between House and Senate members who disagreed 
over whether the commission should allow defendants who admitted 
guilt at trial to later claim innocence.91 On August 3, 2006, Governor 
Easley signed the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission Act 
into law, and North Carolina became the first state in the United 
States to establish a standing innocence commission to review 
possible wrongful convictions.92 
The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (NCIIC) 
Act93 created a new independent review commission “to investigate 
and determine credible claims of factual innocence” in North 
Carolina.94 It includes a sunset provision that disbands the NCIIC in 
fours years unless the General Assembly renews the law.95 The NCIIC 
consists of eight voting members appointed by the Chief Justice of the 
North Carolina Supreme Court and the Chief Judge of the Court of 
Appeals. Its members must include one superior court judge, one 
prosecuting attorney, one victim advocate, one criminal defense 
 
 89. The proposal drafted by the NCAIC underwent five modifications in the General 
Assembly before being passed: (1) In Section 15A-1463(a), with the addition of an acting sheriff 
to the NCIIC, the number of voting members was increased from seven to eight; (2) In Section 
15A-1463(a), instead of the Chief Justice appointing all of the voting members, appointing 
authority was shifted, such that the Chief Justice appoints five members (including the two 
discretionary appointments) and the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals appoints three 
members; (3) In Section 15A-1467(b), a sentence was added stating that the waiver of 
procedural safeguards and privileges does not apply to matters unrelated to the defendant’s 
innocence claim; (4) In Section 15A-1468(c), the standard for cases where the defendant was 
convicted on a plea of guilty was changed, such that a unanimous vote of the eight NCIIC 
members is required for judicial review; and (5) a sunset provision was added that disbands the 
NCIIC in four years unless legislators renew the law. Compare H.R. 1323, 147th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005), with H.R. 1323, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006) (enacted). 
 90. H.R. 1323, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006). The bill passed the House by a 
vote of 86 to 28 and passed the Senate by a vote of 46 to 2. North Carolina General Assembly, 
http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2005&BillID=H1323 (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2007). 
 91. Andrea Weigl, Innocence Bill Passed by House, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), 
Jul. 26, 2006, at 5B. A conference committee devised the following compromise: The 
commission will not allow claims from defendants convicted on a guilty plea in the first two 
years of its operations. Id.; see infra notes 107–110 and accompanying text. 
 92. Weir, supra note 8. 
 93. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1460 to 15A-1475 (Supp. 2006). 
 94. § 15A-1461. 
 95. 2006-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 79 (LexisNexis). 
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attorney, one acting sheriff, one member of the public,96and two other 
members at the discretion of the Chief Justice.97 
The NCIIC will only review claims of factual innocence—not 
legal or procedural claims—and these will be heavily screened at the 
discretion of the NCIIC’s staff to ensure that only credible claims 
generate formal inquiries.98 Some NCAIC members believe that 
current law school innocence projects, such as the Duke Law 
Innocence Project, could assume initial screening responsibilities on 
behalf of the NCIIC.99 The NCIIC requires that a defendant filing a 
claim assert “complete innocence of any criminal responsibility for 
the felony for which the [defendant] was convicted and for any other 
reduced level of criminal responsibility relating to the crime.”100 
Moreover, the defendant has to provide “credible, verifiable evidence 
of innocence that has not previously been presented at trial or 
considered at a hearing granted through postconviction relief.”101 
In addition, the Act seeks to minimize gratuitous claims of 
factual innocence by requiring the defendant to sign an agreement, 
before any formal inquiry is granted, in which the defendant 
voluntarily “waives his or her procedural safeguards and privileges, 
agrees to cooperate with the [NCIIC], and agrees to provide full 
disclosure regarding all inquiry requirements of the [NCIIC].”102 If 
any evidence of a crime is disclosed to the NCIIC during the 
proceedings, it will refer that evidence to the prosecution103 unless it is 
unrelated to the crime for which the defendant is claiming factual 
 
 96. The member of the public must be neither an attorney nor a judge. § 15A-1463(a). 
 97. Id. 
 98. § 15A-1466; Mumma, supra note 3. 
 99. Memorandum from the N.C. Actual Innocence Comm’n, Structural and Operational 
Discussion Points 3 (Oct. 15, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 100. § 15A-1460(1). 
 101. Id. 
 102. § 15A-1467(b). 
 103. See § 15A-1468(d) (“Evidence of criminal acts, professional misconduct, or other 
wrongdoing disclosed through formal inquiry or Commission proceedings shall be referred to 
the appropriate authority.”); Staff of Carolina Journal Online, supra note 78. Christine Mumma, 
Executive Dir. of the North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission, stated, “Another way of 
weeding [noncredible] cases out . . . is [that] there has to be consequences for inmates who claim 
innocence when indeed they are not. So anything uncovered during an investigation . . . would 
be turned over to the prosecution.” Id. 
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innocence.104 It will also disclose to the defendant and his attorney any 
favorable evidence that it discovers.105 
In return for prisoners’ full cooperation, the NCIIC will 
independently investigate prisoners’ claims. It is entitled to full 
disclosure from the trial-level defense and prosecution teams and has 
the authority to compel the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of evidence.106 Once a formal inquiry is complete, the 
relevant evidence is presented to the full NCIIC, which can conduct 
open or closed hearings at its discretion.107 Except in cases where the 
defendant pleaded guilty, if at least five of the eight voting members 
believe that “there is sufficient evidence of factual innocence to merit 
judicial review,” then the claim will be referred to a postcommission 
three-judge panel appointed by the Chief Justice.108 For the first two 
years of its existence, the NCIIC will not allow any claims from 
defendants who pleaded guilty;109 after two years, such claims can only 
be referred to the three-judge panel upon a unanimous vote from the 
eight-member commission.110 
The three-judge panel cannot include any trial judge with 
“substantial previous involvement in the case.”111 After an evidentiary 
hearing in which the state is represented by the district attorney or a 
designee, and the defendant is represented by an attorney,112 the 
three-judge panel decides “whether the [defendant] has proved by 
clear and convincing evidence that the [defendant] is innocent of the 
charges.”113 If the three-judge panel is unanimous, the panel dismisses 
all charges against the defendant.114 Although decisions of the NCIIC 
and the three-judge panel are not subject to further review, 
defendants can file additional claims of factual innocence with the 
NCIIC.115 
 
 104. See § 15A-1467(b) (“The waiver under this subsection does not apply to matters 
unrelated to a [defendant’s] claim of innocence.”). 
 105. § 15A-1468(d). 
 106. § 15A-1467(d)–(f). 
 107. § 15A-1468(a). 
 108. § 15A-1468(c). 
 109. Weigl, supra note 91. 
 110. Id. 
 111. § 15A-1469(a). 
 112. § 15A-1469(c)–(e). 
 113. § 15A-1469(h). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See § 15A-1470(a) (“[D]ecisions of the Commission . . . are final and not 
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III.  THE UNITED KINGDOM’S  
CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION 
The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) is the 
independent review commission in the United Kingdom that reviews 
suspected miscarriages of criminal justice.116 Given that many of the 
fundamental characteristics of the NCIIC were based upon those of 
the CCRC, it is important to understand the CCRC’s origin and 
structure. 
The criminal justice systems in the United Kingdom and the 
United States, although not identical, are quite similar with respect to 
the characteristics relevant to a comparison between the NCIIC and 
the CCRC.117 Both systems employ substantially the same basic 
procedures to carry a case from arrest to conviction, and from 
conviction through appeal.118 For example, in both countries law 
enforcement officials investigate criminal offenses and a central 
prosecutors’ office prosecutes the offense on behalf of the 
government.119 In addition, the Crown Courts and the Criminal 
Division of the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom are 
analogous to state trial and appellate courts in the United States, and 
the House of Lords is similar to the U.S. Supreme Court in that it 
decides only appeals on points of law of general public importance.120 
Thus, the CCRC can provide a useful model for the NCIIC in North 
Carolina. 
One difference between the two systems is that separation of 
powers issues do not exist within the parliamentary system of the 
United Kingdom, but are fundamental to North Carolina’s tripartite 
 
subject to further review . . . .”); Robertson, supra note 34 (“There are no appeals to the judges’ 
ruling, but defendants could file additional requests for review with the commission.”). 
 116. 2004–2005 CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N ANN. REP. 10 (U.K.) [hereinafter 2004–
2005 CCRC ANN. REP.]; 1998–1999 CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N ANN. REP. 6 (U.K.) 
[hereinafter 1998–1999 CCRC ANN. REP.]. 
 117. Findley, supra note 14, at 100–05; Griffin, supra note 69, at 1243–46. 
 118. David Horan, The Innocence Commission: An Independent Review Board for Wrongful 
Convictions, 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 91, 102 (2002) (“[T]he overall structure of the English courts 
is very similar to that of the criminal courts in the United States.” (quoting J. DAVID HIRSCHEL 
& WILLIAM WAKEFIELD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 127 
(1995))). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 103. 
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government.121 A separation of powers issue is, however, unlikely to 
arise over the NCIIC because, as with the CCRC, the judiciary makes 
the actual decision on each defendant’s case. The nonbinding nature 
of the recommendations made by the NCIIC and CCRC preserves 
their independence and insulates them from political pressures.122 
Another difference is that North Carolina allows postconviction 
challenges through direct appeals and collateral remedies, such as the 
MAR and federal habeas relief, whereas the United Kingdom 
provides only limited opportunities for direct appeals and no 
mechanism for collateral remedies.123 Unlike the NCIIC, the CCRC 
provides a forum for postconviction challenges that otherwise does 
not exist in the United Kingdom.124 However, as discussed in Part I, 
the collateral remedies in North Carolina also provide little or no 
redress for prisoners with factual innocence claims.125 Given the 
procedural and judge-related limitations, such claims are rarely 
litigated under the current system. Therefore, the NCIIC, like the 
CCRC, does not simply add another layer of review, but instead 
serves an essentially unique function.126 
The CCRC was established in response to concerns similar to 
those that undermined public confidence in the criminal justice 
system throughout the United States. Before 1997, miscarriage of 
justice claims in the United Kingdom were made to the home 
secretary under Section 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act of 1968, and 
were referred to the Court of Appeal at the secretary’s discretion.127 
In practice, cases were referred only when new evidence emerged 
after the trial; even then, the Court of Appeal took a narrow view of 
these claims.128 The system of review by the home secretary “was . . . 
 
 121. See id. at 101 (contrasting the United Kingdom’s system with state governments 
generally). 
 122. See Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neufeld, Toward the Formation of “Innocence 
Commissions” in America, 86 JUDICATURE 98, 104 (2002) (asserting that an essential element of 
innocence commissions is that their recommendations should not be binding). 
 123. Id. at 104–05. 
 124. Findley, supra note 14, at 345. 
 125. See supra notes 34–75 and accompanying text (discussing remedies under North 
Carolina law for innocent prisoners with factual innocence claims). 
 126. See Griffin, supra note 69, at 1303 (responding to hypothetical objections to an 
independent review commission). 
 127. CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, INTRODUCING THE COMM’N (2002) (UK), 
available at http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/about.htm. 
 128. Id. 
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thought to be unacceptably slow, insufficiently independent, and to 
deliver too many wrong decisions.”129 
High-profile cases of wrongfully convicted persons, such as those 
concerning the West Midlands Serious Crime Squad and the 
Birmingham Six, highlighted weaknesses in the United Kingdom’s 
criminal justice system. In 1989, the West Midlands Serious Crime 
Squad was disbanded amid allegations of wrongdoing, and an 
independent police inquiry produced evidence that the squad 
fabricated evidence, tortured suspects, and coerced confessions.130 
This evidence led to thirty convictions being quashed by the Court of 
Appeal.131 In 1991, six men, known as the Birmingham Six, were 
released from prison after serving sixteen years for crimes they did 
not commit. The men were arrested in 1974 after bombs exploded in 
two Birmingham pubs, killing twenty-one people and injuring more 
than 160 in the bloodiest IRA attack to that date.132 They were 
released after a government inquiry revealed irregularities in the 
police investigation, including altered statements and imperfect 
forensic tests.133 
In response to such cases and growing public concern, the home 
secretary announced the establishment of a Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice in 1991.134 The Royal Commission was established to 
review “the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in securing the 
conviction of the guilty and the acquittal of the innocent.”135 The 
Royal Commission presented a report to Parliament in July 1993 that 
recommended the creation of an independent body to screen and 
investigate suspected miscarriages of justice and refer appropriate 
cases to the Court of Appeal.136 This proposal received a mixed 
reaction from commentators. Some believed it would add an 
 
 129. SELECT COMM. ON HOME AFFAIRS, THE WORK OF THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW 
COMM’N, FIRST REPORT, 1998–99, H.C. 106, at 1, available at http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmhaff/106/10602.htm. 
 130. Ian Burrell, West Midlands Serious Crime Squad, INDEP. (London), Nov. 1, 1999, at A8. 
 131. Id. 
 132. On This Day: 14 Mar. 1991: Birmingham Six Freed After Sixteen Years, BBC NEWS 
ONLINE, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/14/newsid_2543000/2543613.stm 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 
 133. CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 127. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and obscure the role of the courts.137 
Others commended the proposal because it recognized the system’s 
failure to seek out new evidence of innocence and proposed an 
independent body that would be more insulated from political and 
judicial pressures.138 
The proposal gained widespread acceptance from members of 
Parliament—across all political parties—as politicians generally 
recognized the need for an independent review commission.139 The 
Criminal Appeal Act of 1995, which established the Criminal Cases 
Review Commission (CCRC), was subsequently passed, and the 
CCRC began handling cases in March of 1997.140 
The CCRC is an independent public body, accountable to the 
home secretary, that reviews suspected miscarriages of criminal 
justice.141 By statute, the CCRC may consist of no fewer than eleven 
commissioners.142 Commissioners are appointed by the Queen on the 
advice of the Prime Minister;143 at least one-third must be lawyers and 
at least two-thirds must have expertise in the criminal justice 
system.144 
The CCRC refers cases to the Court of Appeal where “there is a 
real possibility that the conviction, verdict, finding or sentence would 
not be upheld were the reference to be made.”145 A miscarriage of 
justice claim must be based on “an argument, or evidence, not raised 
in the proceedings . . . [or] exceptional circumstances.”146 Absent 
 
 137. Horan, supra note 118, at 131–32 (citing A Just Commission: The Runciman Report is 
Good in Most of its Parts, TIMES (London), July 7, 1993, at A17). 
 138. Id. at 133–34 (citing Gareth Williams, In the True Interests of Justice, TIMES (London), 
July 7, 1993, at A16). 
 139. See, e.g., Righting the Past: It’s Society Versus the Courts, GUARDIAN (London), July 21, 
1998, at 15 (noting that the creation of the CCRC “reflected a widespread unease—across 
society and the political parties—at the growing number of miscarriages of justice”). 
 140. Id. 
 141. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 10; 1998–1999 CCRC ANN. REP., supra 
note 116, at 6. 
 142. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 8(3) (Eng.). In 2007, the eleven commissioners were 
Professor Graham Zellick (Chair), Alastair R. MacGregor QC, Michael Allen, Penelope 
Barrett, Mark Emerton, Jim England, Julie Goulding, David Jessel, Ian Nichol, Ewen Smith, 
and John Weeden. Criminal Cases Review Comm’n, Commissioners, 
http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/about/about_29.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). 
 143. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 8(4). 
 144. Id. § 8(5)–(6). 
 145. Id. § 13(1)(a). 
 146. Id. § 13(1)(b)(i), (2). Exceptional circumstances include cases in which evidence was 
not discovered by the defense at the time of trial because of, for example, “legal incompetence,” 
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“exceptional circumstances,” only cases that have exhausted their 
appeals are eligible for referral.147 Though the Criminal Appeal Act 
does not define the standard for “real possibility,” the Court of 
Appeal describes the standard as “more than an outside chance or a 
bare possibility but which may be less than a probability or a 
likelihood or a racing certainty” that the conviction, verdict, finding 
or sentence would be found “unsafe.”148 
Stage One149 of the CCRC review process is an eligibility 
assessment. Once the CCRC receives an application from a person 
making a miscarriage of justice claim, a commissioner determines 
whether it is eligible for review.150 About one-third of the applications 
are closed during Stage One.151 The vast majority of applications 
determined to be ineligible are applications where the appeals 
process has not been exhausted.152 An application is also ineligible for 
review if it arises from a criminal conviction outside of England, 
Wales, or Northern Ireland.153 
Stage Two of the review process is screening and intensive 
review. Commissioners study the applications passed from Stage One 
and preserve the documents held by public bodies that are relevant to 
the applications.154 Cases requiring limited review are screened and 
usually completed within ninety working days.155 Cases requiring more 
 
“mistaken tactical decision,” or a “failure to appreciate its full significance.” Griffin, supra note 
69, at 1276. 
 147. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 13(1)(c) (“A reference . . . shall not be 
made . . . unless an appeal against the conviction, verdict, finding or sentence has been 
determined or leave to appeal against it has been refused.”); 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra 
note 116, at 22 (“If the appeals process has not been exhausted and . . . there are no exceptional 
circumstances, the case is closed.”). 
 148. R v. CCRC, ex p. Pearson, (1999) 3 All E.R. 498 (Q.B.). “The Court of Appeal is the 
highest court within the [U.K. court system], which also includes the High Court and Crown 
Court.” Her Majesty’s Courts Service, Information About—Court of Appeal, http:// 
www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/1235.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2007). 
 149. The CCRC annual reports designate three different stages of the review process: Stage 
One is an eligibility assessment; Stage Two is screening and intensive review; and Stage Three is 
the appointment of an investigative officer. See generally 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra 
note 116; 1998–1999 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116. 
 150. 1998–1999 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 8. 
 151. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 22. 
 152. 1998–1999 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 8. 
 153. Id. 
 154. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 22. By statute, the CCRC has the 
power to obtain documents from public bodies. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 17 (Eng.). 
 155. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 22. 
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intensive review are assigned to caseworkers and may be investigated 
through the use of CCRC resources, the appointment of an outside 
expert, or the formal appointment of an investigative officer.156 
Stage Three of the review process is the appointment of an 
investigative officer. The CCRC will appoint an investigative officer if 
the case is particularly complex or involves other alleged crimes.157 
However, few cases proceed to Stage Three: between 1997 and 2005, 
only thirty-seven cases required the appointment of an investigative 
officer.158 
Case reviews result in either a decision by the CCRC to refer the 
application to the Court of Appeal, or a decision that the CCRC is 
“not minded to refer.”159 A decision of “not minded to refer” is made 
by one commissioner with no previous involvement in the case.160 If a 
referral seems likely after Stage Two or Stage Three, the application 
is passed to a committee, and a caseworker presents an overview of 
the case to the commissioners.161 A decision to refer a case can only be 
made by a committee of at least three commissioners with no 
previous involvement in the case.162 
Following a referral by the CCRC, the Court of Appeal makes a 
decision on the case. The standard for granting relief based on new 
evidence is far lower in the United Kingdom’s courts than in the 
United States. The United Kingdom’s Court of Appeal must receive 
new evidence if (1) the evidence is capable of belief, (2) the evidence 
may afford any ground for an appeal, (3) the evidence relates to an 
issue on appeal, and would have been admissible in the proceedings 
giving rise to the appeal, and (4) there is a reasonable explanation for 
the failure to adduce the evidence in those proceedings.163 Given the 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 23; Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 19. The investigative officer has always 
been a senior police officer. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 23. 
 158. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 23. 
 159. 1998–1999 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 9. 
 160. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 22–23. If a decision of “not minded to 
refer” is made, the applicant is provided an opportunity to respond to CCRC’s provisional 
statement of reasons. Id. The applicant’s response is considered before a final decision is made. 
Id. at 23. In practice, the primary reasons given for non-referral decisions have been “the court’s 
sense that the defendant was merely seeking a chance to put in a new defense after the first one 
had failed or because new evidence was insufficiently compelling to render the conviction 
unsafe.” Griffin, supra note 69, at 1280. 
 161. 1998–1999 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 9. 
 162. Id.; 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 23. 
 163. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 4 (Eng.). 
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new evidence, the Court of Appeal must “allow an appeal against 
conviction if they think that the conviction is unsafe.”164 A survey by 
one commentator revealed that the Court of Appeal is quite liberal in 
reversing convictions based on new evidence, investigative 
misconduct, eyewitness misidentification, and scientific evidence.165 
The CCRC received “unanimously benign press” in its first year 
of operation, but commentators began to criticize it more frequently 
as CCRC decisions came under judicial review and its caseload 
increased.166 Some called the review process “too meticulous” and 
said “the CCRC . . . appears to be performing supererogatory 
functions.”167 In 2004–2005 forty-one applicants mounted challenges 
by judicial review against the CCRC, a fivefold increase from the 
prior fiscal year.168 Some of these challenges related to, for example, 
delays in processing a claim and decisions not to pursue particular 
investigative steps.169 However, media coverage of the CCRC—both 
positive and negative—has faded in recent years.170 
The CCRC received a total of 7,602 applications between 1997 
and 2005, including 955 applications in 2004–2005.171 As of March 31, 
2005, the CCRC had referred 271 (4.4 percent) of 6,842 cases it 
reviewed to appeals courts.172 As these statistics indicate, a significant 
backlog developed in the CCRC’s initial years.173 An unexpectedly 
high volume of cases combined with a lack of resources overwhelmed 
the CCRC in its first few years and caused delays in processing new 
 
 164. Id. § 2(1). 
 165. Griffin, supra note 69, at 1282–87. 
 166. Bob Woffinden, Justice Delayed, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 6, 1998, at 17. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 27 (“In 2004–05 there were 41 such 
challenges compared to eight in 2003–04.”). 
 169. Id. The CCRC has established formal policy and procedures for judicial review that 
allow applicants to “challenge breach[es] . . . of the public law principles of lawfulness, fairness 
and reasonableness.” CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, JUDICIAL REVIEW BY APPLICANTS, 
DOCUMENT NO. 621938, 1, available at http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/documents/JUDICIAL_REVI 
EW_BY_APPLICANTS.pdf. 
 170. Cf. David Jessel, Turning a Blind Eye, GUARDIAN (London), July 13, 2004, at 16. 
Commissioner David Jessel has suggested that the CCRC has caused a precipitous decline in 
investigative journalism because miscarriage of justice claims have become the CCRC’s domain. 
Id. 
 171. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 24. The CCRC has also received 540 
reapplications, of which 21 have been referred to appeals courts. Id. at 27. 
 172. Id. at 26. 
 173. Id. at 25–26. 
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applications.174 In 1998, the CCRC estimated that new applicants 
would “have to wait up to two years before their cases can be 
[reviewed] and it may be more than 30 years before the backlog is 
cleared.”175 Additionally, limitations on the budget have led to fewer 
cases being completed and rising waitlists.176 
Despite this backlog, CCRC has achieved relative success in 
referring cases with a “real possibility” of reversal to the appeals 
courts and ultimately correcting miscarriages of justice.177 Between 
1997 and 2005, the appeals courts decided on 229 referrals, quashing 
135 convictions and upholding 63 convictions.178 Moreover, the CCRC 
has made great strides in restoring public confidence in the justice 
system by providing a receptive government forum for miscarriage of 
justice claims.179 Although there are certainly some areas for 
improvement, the CCRC has been called “incomparably better” than 
the previous system of review.180 
IV.  COMPARISON OF THE NORTH CAROLINA INNOCENCE INQUIRY 
COMMISSION AND THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION 
Both the NCIIC and CCRC operate as independent bodies, 
removed from the judiciary and executive, that conduct impartial 
investigations into factual innocence or miscarriage of justice claims.181 
Their independence limits political pressures that invariably surround 
investigations into suspected mistakes by other government bodies. 
The representative diversity on the commissions, mandated by 
statute, allows for varied perspectives in the decisionmaking 
 
 174. Horan, supra note 118, at 162–63. 
 175. Id. (quoting Alan Travis, Justice Body’s Case Plea Rebuffed by Straw, GUARDIAN 
(London), Dec. 16, 1998, at 12.) 
 176. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 6. Budget constraints led to a 
moratorium on CCRC hiring in 2004–2005; as a result, CCRC could not increase the number of 
case review managers to a level necessary to clear the backlog. Id. 
 177. See Grania Langdon-Down, Justice Will Be Done, INDEP. (London), Mar. 30, 1998, at 
23 (suggesting that defense lawyers who had previously been critical of the CCRC have 
generally been pleased with its operations). Chairman Zellick has described the CCRC as a 
“conspicuous success.” Joshua Rozenberg, Justice Watchdog Widens Appeal, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 4, 2003, at 22. 
 178. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 26. 
 179. See Horan, supra note 118, at 155–56. Investigative journalists, for example, who had 
long provided a vehicle for uncovering miscarriage of justice claims, learned that the 
government was now willing to listen and cooperate with them. Id. at 155. 
 180. Langdon-Down, supra note 177. 
 181. See supra notes 92–97, 141–144 and accompanying text. 
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process.182 Moreover, as standing commissions, both the NCIIC and 
CCRC can routinely review all types of claims, not just high-profile 
claims, and uncover mistakes that would have otherwise been 
ignored.183 
The NCIIC and CCRC both preserve judicial economy by 
screening out meritless wrongful conviction claims and identifying for 
the courts the claims most deserving of further review. The CCRC’s 
referral statistics indicate that it employs a heavy screening 
mechanism: only 4.4 percent of the completed cases were referred to 
appeals courts.184 A similar procedure is envisioned for the NCIIC, 
where “claims would be heavily screened, to ensure that only credible 
claims are considered” before the formal voting members of the 
NCIIC.185 Once there, the NCIIC must find sufficient evidence of 
factual innocence to refer the claim to the court system.186 The NCIIC 
also hopes to screen gratuitous claims through a waiver of safeguards 
and privileges, discussed below.187 
Both the NCIIC and CCRC require that a defendant’s claim be 
based on newly discovered evidence.188 Thus, any objections that the 
NCIIC or the courts would be second-guessing juries are unfounded, 
because the NCIIC would not consider claims where the evidence was 
previously presented before a jury.189 
The NCIIC conducts public hearings at its own discretion; there 
is no statutory mandate to open its proceedings to the public.190 
Similarly, the CCRC’s proceedings are generally closed to the public, 
as there is a general prohibition on the disclosure of any information 
to non-applicants.191 Peg Dorer, a member of the North Carolina 
Conference of District Attorneys, has argued that all the NCIIC’s 
 
 182. See supra notes 96–97, 144 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 122, at 103–05 (identifying the essential elements of 
an innocence commission and proposing a model for investigating wrongful convictions based 
on the National Transportation Safety Board and Canadian Innocence Inquiry models). 
 184. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 26. 
 185. Mumma, supra note 3. 
 186. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1468(c) (2006). 
 187. See infra notes 196–198 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 101, 146 and accompanying text. 
 189. See § 15A-1460(1) (The defendant must provide “credible, verifiable evidence of 
innocence that has not previously been presented at trial or considered at a hearing granted 
through postconviction relief.”). 
 190. Id. § 15A-1468(a). 
 191. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, §§ 23–25 (Eng.). 
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proceedings should be open to the public, just like most other 
proceedings in the criminal justice system. Prosecutors were already 
uncomfortable with the loss of control over these cases; closed 
meetings further compound the issue.192 However, closed proceedings 
allow the NCIIC “to exercise sensible control over the length and 
breadth of their proceedings” and prevent proceedings from turning 
into television dramas or political forums.193 Like the CCRC, 
transparency can be achieved by the NCIIC through annual reports, 
website information, and budgetary disclosures.194 In addition, the 
NCIIC’s evidence disclosure requirements provide another layer of 
transparency.195 
One of the major distinctions between the CCRC and the NCIIC 
is the NCIIC’s requirement that defendants waive their procedural 
safeguards and agree to provide full disclosure before a formal 
inquiry into their factual innocence claim begins.196 In addition, if the 
NCIIC uncovers evidence of a crime, the NCIIC must disclose that 
evidence to the prosecution unless the evidence is unrelated to the 
defendant’s claim. The General Assembly wisely closed the loophole 
left by the NCAIC, which would have subjected defendants to 
prosecution for crimes—unrelated to their innocence claim—revealed 
during the investigation of their claim.197 Such broad waiver and 
disclosure requirements could have screened out credible claims of 
factual innocence, because defendants would have feared exposure to 
unrelated charges. 
Defendants probably remain wary that evidence obtained by the 
NCIIC may be used against them in other postconviction 
proceedings. Nevertheless, pursuing such “an extraordinary 
procedure to investigate credible claims should require an 
 
 192. N.C. Actual Innocence Comm’n, Minutes of the Meeting 2 (Feb. 18, 2005) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal). 
 193. See Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 122, at 105 (describing the balance that must be 
struck between transparency and control). 
 194. Id. 
 195. See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text. Evidence of criminal acts is disclosed 
to the prosecution, whereas favorable evidence is disclosed to the defendant and his attorney. 
Id. 
 196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1467(b) (2006). 
 197. Robertson, supra note 34. State Senator R.C. Soles, D-Columbus, believed the waiver 
and disclosure requirements in the original bill were too severe, and he likely played a 
significant role in closing the loophole. Id. Soles had said, “If you’re sitting over there on death 
row and you know you’re not guilty and you can prove it, I don’t see why you need to waive 
your constitutional rights and admit you stole your grandmother’s purse.” Id. 
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extraordinary commitment by the defendant” to waive their rights 
and cooperate fully with all inquiries.198 As a truth-seeking 
commission, the NCIIC depends on the full cooperation of all 
claimants for the system to work. This extraordinary commitment 
should act as a strong screening mechanism against frivolous claims 
and allow the NCIIC to avoid the backlog that plagues the CCRC. 
While the CCRC allows miscarriage of justice claims regardless 
of the plea entered in the trial court, the compromise reached in the 
North Carolina General Assembly prevents defendants who pleaded 
guilty from seeking relief through the NCIIC in its first two years of 
existence;199 after that, those defendants must meet a higher standard 
than any other claimants.200 Even so, state prosecutors are not pleased 
with the compromise; some have suggested that it is “‘making a 
mockery of the system.’”201 Critics maintain that allowing those who 
declared their guilt to now maintain their innocence is an affront to 
the integrity of the criminal justice system.202 Nevertheless, defendants 
convicted on a guilty plea may still have credible innocence claims. 
Some defendants plead guilty because it is a plea bargain: they may 
be innocent, but do not want to risk a longer sentence at trial. Others 
may not have understood what they agreed to, or may have received 
bad advice from their counsel. According to the Innocence Project, 4 
percent of the people exonerated by DNA evidence between 1989 
and 2006 had pleaded guilty at trial.203 To provide full protection for 
such defendants, the legislature should consider relaxing the higher 
burden that applies to innocence claims brought by prisoners who 
initially pleaded guilty, and treating all claimants equally. 
Unlike the CCRC, the NCIIC does not require by statute that 
defendants exhaust all appeals to be eligible for factual innocence 
 
 198. N.C. ACTUAL INNOCENCE COMM’N, BILL INTRODUCTION SUMMARY: INNOCENCE 
INQUIRY COMMISSION 2 (2005). 
 199. Weigl, supra note 91. 
 200. See § 15A-1468(c) (requiring all eight members of the commission to vote for judicial 
review for defendants who pleaded guilty versus only five votes needed for review for other 
defendants). 
 201. Mike Baker, N.C. Lawmakers OK Innocence Commission, BOSTON.COM, July 26, 2006, 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/07/26/nc_lawmakers_ok_innocence_com 
mission (last visited Feb. 24, 2007) (quoting Garry Frank, president of the district attorneys’ 
coalition). 
 202. Andrea Weigl, N.C. Innocence Panel Awaits Easley’s Blessing, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 27, 2006, at 10A. 
 203. Id. 
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review.204 Thus, defendants are allowed to make simultaneous claims 
through the NCIIC and court system. To limit the number of claims 
filed with the NCIIC, many prosecutors wanted the NCIIC to review 
only claims where all appeals had been exhausted.205 Others argue 
that an exhaustion requirement would “ensure that defendants will 
not simply bypass appellate court remedies to try their claims with a 
possibly more sympathetic, quasi-judicial body.”206 However, this 
argument suggests that defendants with credible claims of innocence 
do not deserve timely review from an independent commission and 
must first petition appellate courts that are not designed to hear 
factual claims. This argument also overlooks the cases where the 
NCIIC would provide relief before the defendant exhausts all of his 
appeals. If the defendant has a credible claim of innocence, the 
NCIIC is likely to provide more immediate relief, obviating the 
defendant’s need to clutter the court system with additional claims. 
Thus, the NCIIC improves judicial economy because it acts as a 
screening mechanism for the courts. 
In the United Kingdom, the standard for reversal of a conviction 
is whether the appeals court finds the conviction to be “unsafe.”207 
This standard places the burden of defending the conviction on the 
prosecution. Under the NCIIC, the standard for reversal is whether 
the three-judge panel finds “clear and convincing evidence” of the 
defendant’s innocence.208 This standard places the burden of proving 
innocence on the defendant.209 The more-restrictive NCIIC standard 
balances the fundamental correctness of the conviction against the 
state’s interest in the finality of its criminal justice proceedings, giving 
more weight to the finality interest than the United Kingdom’s 
standard does.210 Because of the passage of time associated with 
collateral remedies like the NCIIC, proceedings will likely be plagued 
 
 204. See supra note 147. 
 205. Cf. Andrea Weigl, Innocence Principals Seek Accord, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, 
N.C.), May 21, 2005, at 5B (listing the changes to the NCIIC sought by prosecutors and defense 
attorneys). 
 206. Horan, supra note 118, at 171. 
 207. See supra notes 145–48, and accompanying text. 
 208. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1469(h) (2006). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Cf. supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (discussing how the United States 
Supreme Court is similarly concerned with balancing the fundamental correctness of a 
conviction against the state’s interest in the finality of proceedings in the context of federal 
habeas relief). 
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by the “erosion of memory” and “dispersion of witnesses.”211 Thus, 
the more-restrictive standard is acceptable because it protects the 
public from guilty defendants being released.212 
While the CCRC only has the authority to compel the 
production of documents from public bodies,213 the NCIIC has full 
statutory authority to compel document production, just as the courts 
do.214 This represents an improvement upon the CCRC model, and 
the CCRC has begun to lobby for more complete authority over 
private bodies based on the investigative limitations it has 
experienced.215 
While both the NCIIC and CCRC allow unlimited reapplications 
by defendants, only the NCIIC forecloses the right to judicial review 
of its decisions. In the United Kingdom, the benefits to judicial 
economy that the CCRC offers are threatened by the possibility that 
its decisions not to refer cases will be reviewed judicially.216 The 
NCIIC avoids this issue because “the decisions of the [NCIIC] and of 
the three-judge panel are final and not subject to further review by 
appeal, certification, writ, motion, or otherwise.”217 
Finally, although the United Kingdom’s commission is entitled 
the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the North Carolina 
commission has a more narrow title: the North Carolina Innocence 
Inquiry Commission. The “innocence” moniker appears to limit the 
scope of the NCIIC and forms an implicit judgment about its mission: 
that the NCIIC is merely a “criminal defense movement when it 
really is much more.”218 The NCIIC is concerned not only with 
protecting the innocent, but also with seeking justice. An effective 
and efficient criminal justice system is achieved by “both acquitting 
 
 211. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 
127–28 (1982)). 
 212. See id. 
 213. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 17 (Eng.). 
 214. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1467(d)–(f) (2006). 
 215. Horan, supra note 118, at 159. 
 216. See id. at 168 (asserting that making decisions of the commission not judicially 
reviewable was a “more sensible design”). 
 217. § 15A-1470(a). This Note centers on comparisons between the NCIIC and CCRC, and 
it does not seek to address whether some defendants who have been denied review by the 
NCIIC could have valid due process or other constitutional claims, despite the statutory 
language foreclosing judicial review. 
 218. See Findley, supra note 14, at 353 (championing “Criminal Justice Study Commission” 
as a more appropriate title for proposed commissions instead of “Innocence Commissions”). 
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the innocent and convicting the guilty,”219 and the NCIIC helps North 
Carolina achieve both of these goals. Thus, the legislature should 
have followed the United Kingdom’s model and adopted a more 
inclusive title; for example, it could have named the commission, the 
“North Carolina Criminal Cases Review Commission.” 
The single greatest impediment to the success of the CCRC is a 
lack of funding and resources.220 Budget issues also plague the NCIIC 
at this early juncture. Supporters of the NCIIC had hoped for a 
budget of close to $500,000, but the legislature appropriated only 
$210,000.221 The NCIIC hopes to close that gap by relying on the pro 
bono work of law students who would screen claims through their law 
school’s Innocence Project. An overreliance on volunteers may, 
unfortunately, lead to significant backlogs when these schools are not 
in session. 
The CCRC has achieved relative success in correcting 
miscarriages of justice.222 From a comparative perspective, the NCIIC 
should be able to match that success if it can avoid the budget and 
resource pitfalls, and operate in a manner that improves judicial 
economy. The average British citizen knows very little about the 
CCRC, but publicity from high-profile exonerations has helped to 
increase public confidence in the system. It may be difficult for the 
NCIIC to fly under the radar—instead it is likely that it will be subject 
to intense media scrutiny—but “conspicuous success”223 in its first few 
years may help it overcome some early obstacles and high-profile 
reversals would certainly aid the cause. Just as the appellate process 
in the United Kingdom was not designed to handle miscarriages of 
justice, the avenues for postconviction relief in the United States were 
not adequately equipped to address claims of factual innocence. The 
NCIIC fills that gap and provides a model for other states and the 
federal government. 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. See supra notes 171–176 and accompanying text. 
 221. Phoebe Zerwick, New Panel Hopes, Hurdles; Three-Step Process Creates Another 
Chance at Freedom for the Wrongly Convicted; Innocence Commission First in Nation to 
Backstop Courts, WINSTON-SALEM J., Aug. 20, 2006. at A1. 
 222. See supra notes 177–180 and accompanying text. 
 223. Rozenberg, supra note 177. 
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CONCLUSION 
The cases of Darryl Hunt, Alan Gell, Ronald Cotton, and others 
have eroded public confidence in North Carolina’s criminal justice 
system and demonstrated the need for change. Innocent people were 
wrongfully convicted, and before the NCIIC there was no effective 
mechanism to correct these mistakes because under other methods of 
postconviction review “the opportunity for bringing new evidence is 
extremely limited; the standard of review is intolerably high; and 
clemency is so rarely granted as to be virtually meaningless.”224 
Consequently, innocent prisoners in North Carolina had limited 
access to a forum for presenting their factual innocence claims. The 
NCIIC ameliorates that problem by providing an effective forum for 
those prisoners where new evidence strongly supports their factual 
innocence claims. By establishing this commission, North Carolina 
has expressed the importance it places on its criminal justice system 
and on its citizens: “When someone’s freedom—or his very life—is at 
stake, the state should rush, not hesitate, to make sure it recognizes 
and corrects its errors.”225 
Criminal justice experts have identified multiple factors that 
contribute to wrongful convictions in North Carolina and across the 
United States, including false eyewitness identifications, coerced 
confessions, inaccurate lab reports, prosecutorial misconduct, and 
poor legal representation.226 Innocence commissions like the NCIIC 
and the CCRC do not directly address these systemic issues because 
they are designed to provide a safety net for individual miscarriages 
of justice.227 However, innocence commissions can help identify 
patterns in these types of cases and draw much-needed scholarly 
attention to the fallibilities of the criminal justice system.228 The 
NCIIC represents progress because its statutory reporting 
requirement will offer invaluable information on wrongful 
convictions, and that information could become the basis for systemic 
 
 224. Griffin, supra note 69, at 1307. 
 225. Editorial, New Innocence Panel Reflects Well on N.C., PILOT (Southern Pines, N.C.), 
Aug. 11, 2006, available at http://www.thepilot.com/stories/20060808/opinion/opinion/20060808 
PilotEditorial.html. 
 226. Mumma, supra note 3. 
 227. See Findley, supra note 14, at 347–48 (“A commission like the CCRC more directly 
seeks to identify and remedy individual injustices than recommend systemic reforms.”). 
 228. Id. 
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reform.229 The NCIIC’s reports and recommendations, along with 
high-profile findings of innocence, could help promote a climate of 
reform within the North Carolina criminal justice system. Indeed, the 
NCIIC’s pioneering approach to postconviction review of innocence 
claims could also serve as a model for positive reform throughout the 
United States. 
 
 229. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1475 (2006) (requiring that the NCIIC report on its 
activities to various legislative committees and the State Judicial Council); § 7A-409.1 
(mandating that the State Judicial Council produce statistical reports regarding inquiries and 
any recommended changes for the General Assembly). 
